Responsum: On Communal Leadership

Question: The holy community of Rhodes (may their Rock protect and sustain them) agreed and accepted upon themselves, under the threat of very severe penalties, that no member of Israel—not Sargons¹ nor others like them—would serve as Kehaya² over all or part of the community. They appointed three parnasim [community leaders] in charge of them, who have the final authority over all matters, and no one may receive permission to depart from these decisions other than by means of the parnasim. If an officer or government official wishes to place a Kehaya over them, they will make every effort to ensure that the wishes of the community prevail, and that nobody strays from them unless it is through the parnasim etc. The reason for this was that the former Kehaya had caused damage to the public and to individuals, and this agreement was fully accepted by them for a certain period of time. However, now the parnasim have completed their term, and one man has removed himself from the general public and lobbied the ministers. He is idle from labor, and instead deals with resolving communal issues together with the officers and local ministers. Three months have passed since the appointed parnasim ended their term, and this man, the lobbyist, is now their third member and they have declared that “So-and-So, So-and-So, and So-and-So are the parnasim, and so it shall remain on a permanent basis.” The bottom line is that this man, Reuben, reinstated himself as the Kehaya, while remaining a parnas in name alone, as he is constantly receiving audiences before the ministers, and the ministers and all the common people call him Kehaya, while the Jews call him parnas. The few wise men whose hearts have been touched by God are afraid to say anything, as this has become a stumbling-block for the community, and therefore they have asked me what Israel should do about this.

Response: The decisive factor is not a person’s title, but rather his deeds. If this Reuben the parnas causes harm to individuals or the public, the community is certainly in a bind. Consequently, they are obligated, by force of their agreement and the severe penalties which they accepted upon themselves, to make every last effort to reverse this situation, so that he should no longer be a fixed parnas, even if he is called parnas. The reason for the enactment of the decree remains valid, as it is written in their agreement: “when we saw the harm and the losses that have been caused and which will be caused in the future, with the Kehaya appointed over the Jews constantly going in and out before the local ministers etc.” Accordingly, what difference does it make whether he is called a parnas or a scholar? If he is unwilling to leave his post, and they are compelled to pay money for this purpose, everyone is obligated to contribute toward this end, in accordance with the law of an informer.

The Rosh [Asher ben Yeḥiel (ca. 1250–1327)], of blessed memory, wrote similarly in a responsum in chapter six: “if a community spends money to eradicate an informer from the world, all of them must contribute, even those who never pay taxes. The community is obligated to remove him even without unanimous consent, in accordance with the command: you shall put away the evil from your midst” (Deuteronomy 13:6). Although this man is not an informer, nor a slanderer, nor does he inflict damage, nevertheless, since harm is caused to individuals and the public as a result of his presence before the ministers, they are obliged to remove him. [ . . . ] However, if no harm is caused by Reuben the parnas, it seems to me that there is no stumbling-block here at all, as the reason why they had to enact the decree has been obviated.

Now, you might raise the difficulty that with regard to all rabbinic enactments we say that even though the original reason is no longer applicable, the decree remains in force. The answer is that decrees enacted by a community are not the same as enactments of a permanent court, and this is plain. Another problem you might put forward is that they simply decreed that there should be no Kehaya in charge of them, and this man is a Kehaya, as this is what the gentiles call him. This is not difficult either, as both his name and deeds have changed. For the former Kehaya was called the Kehaya and he acted wickedly, whereas the same cannot be said of this man; he is called a parnas and he acts in the manner of the worthy parnasim of Israel. Moreover, the Rosh wrote as follows in his responsum: “a community possessed the right to collect taxes for Torah study and a prayer leader, and they removed this right and imposed a ban on its reinstatement, declaring that this right to collect taxes shall not return again. Later, a majority of them changed their minds and wished to restore it by adjusting it, either by adding to or subtracting from it, without having to rescind the ban. It is obvious that they may do so, as they have changed the right and proclaimed that this current right is not the same one as that for the ban was imposed; rather it is a new right. Asher, son of R. Yeḥiel, of blessed memory.” You can see from here that since they changed it, even though its name remained the same, he maintained that it is a new right. All the more so in the case at hand, where both the name and the nature of the position have changed. For initially he was called Kehaya by the Jews and now he is known as a parnas; originally, he was by himself, and now he has been joined by two others; at first, he caused harm and now he provides benefits. Consequently, he goes under a new name etc. and there is no stumbling-block here, neither for the community nor for this parnas.

If there is a disagreement among the community, with some claiming that he causes harm while others deny this, let them arise and take a vote, as with regard to all such matters the Torah states: incline after a majority (Exodus 23:2). It is true that they made the annulment of the ban dependent even upon the objection of a single person, as stated in this agreement, but this is a different matter, which does not depend upon the nullification of the ban. If it is permitted, then it is permitted without annulment, and if it is not permitted, then even one person can object to its annulment. In any case, I agree that if witnesses came and testified that he caused harm, or that losses or damages were caused by him, they are obligated to remove him, assuming that there is no conflict of interest in their testimony.

You might argue that the language of the agreement can be interpreted as saying that nobody should hold a permanent position of authority over them, even if he does not cause them any harm. However, we have a general principle that “unspecified vows are interpreted stringently, but their specifications are interpreted leniently” [m. Nedarim 2:4]. And the Mishnah proceeds to explain: “if one took a vow by using the term dedication [ḥerem], and subsequently claimed, I took a vow only by a fishing net [ḥerem], his vow does not take effect” [m. Nedarim 2:5]. Therefore, if the community now clarifies that they only meant that there should be no man in charge of them who would cause them harm, we act in accordance with their interpretation. Although the mishnah there concludes by stating that we give him an opening to regret his vow on other grounds, and we thereby annul the vow, whereas in this case it cannot be annulled if even one of them objects, as written in the agreement, that ruling applies only if the interpretation he offered for his statement is very far-fetched, as in the example cited by the Mishnah—“I took a vow only by a fishing net”—or “by offerings to kings,” or “by a bone [‘etsem] that I set aside for myself with which to vow.”³ In all such cases, which involve ignoramuses, an annulment is required. By contrast, when the interpretation put forward for the statement fits his words well, as is the case here, no annulment is necessary, even if he is an ignoramus.

I found a similar argument in the commentary of the Ran [Nissim of Girona (1320–1376)], of blessed memory: “it is only with regard to these examples brought at the end of the mishnah, where the meaning leads to a more stringent than lenient outcome, that we say one must approach a scholar for annulment—in the manner required by the different opinions in the Mishnah—whereas in the cases mentioned in the first part of the mishnah, such as one who vowed by referring to salted meat and subsequently explained that he vowed by the meat of idolaters, or one who vowed by reference to a dedication and he explained that he vowed by a dedication to priests, no annulment is necessary even in the case of an ignoramus.” Rabbenu Tam [Jacob ben Meir (1100–1171)] explained the mishnah similarly, as cited by Tosafot; and the Asheri [the Rosh] writes likewise. The same conclusion is implied by the words of the Rambam [Maimonides [1138–1204)], of blessed memory, as he only wrote the clause “and we open an opening for him on different grounds and annul it for him” in reference to the last part of the mishnah, whereas he did not mention annulment at all in connection to the first part. This is plainly correct. Consequently, if the majority of the community were to explain that their intention at the time of the imposition of the ban was that they should not have a Kehaya because he would cause harm, but they did not have in mind such a situation where he would not cause harm, then it is as obvious as the permitted status of an egg in a milk dish⁴ that they are permitted to proceed without having to ask a scholar for annulment.

What is more, even if those people who issued the decree are no longer with us, if the reason they imposed it is no longer applicable, the community is permitted to go ahead. I will go even further than that and claim that if that original Kehaya repents, so that he would no longer cause any harm, it is permitted to appoint him. The Rambam explicitly wrote to this effect in chapter eight of The Laws of Vows:

You thus have a clear-cut case where he is permitted despite the fact that he did not express the reason. All the more so, it is permitted where he did specify the cause, and certainly in the case at hand, where the name has also changed, it is obvious they are permitted without annulment.

You might object: “Since he is constantly having audiences with the ministers, it is impossible for him not to cause harm to individuals or the public.” With regard to this claim I will say that in our current exile we cannot live among them other than by means of bribes and payments. For what can a lamb do among the wolves? They would tear out his wool over the smallest cause, and the verse states: even so shall they be cut down, and he shall pass away (Nahum 1:12). If it appears to the majority of the community that no further harm will result from him to other communities, or at other times, even though there is a certain amount of damage which some attribute to him, we do not listen to them, as it is impossible to survive otherwise. For the son of David [the Messiah] has not yet arrived, and on the contrary, on many occasions it will happen that the damage is minimized when there is a man who is constantly standing in their presence and who recognizes their gestures. It all depends on whether he is a God-fearing individual—if he shows the public that he performs his actions in a God-fearing manner, the severe penalties do not apply at all, but if not, they are obligated to get rid of him and remove him from his post [ . . . ].

Although I have written all of the above as regard the law itself, in practice I do not see the way to the dwelling of light (Job 38:19)—how to discern whether harm or losses would result from the fact that this designated parnas is continually in the presence of the ministers, ready to ask anything of them and to acquiesce to all their wishes, as written in their agreement. Granted fixed matters and regular payments, on a weekly or yearly basis, or the cost of the right to allow exceptions, all such issues can be clarified, but as for such occasional losses that befall an individual or the community, when wicked, libelous accusations are raised against them, how can the truth be ascertained here? [ . . . ] If you say that the matter is uncertain, the Rashba [Solomon Ibn Adret (1235–1310)] has already written that in a responsum that we are stringent in cases of uncertainty involving the public. I will therefore state as a general rule that if it is clear to the community that no damage or loss will be caused by the permanent status of this parnas, they are permitted without annulment of the vow, and the responsibility lies on their shoulders, and if there is doubt about the matter, they are required to remove him; and may the good Lord atone.