Mishnah Zevaḥim

1:4. For a sacrifice can be disqualified in [any one of] the four elements [of the ritual]: slaughtering, receiving, carrying, and sprinkling. R. Simeon declares it valid if carried [with the wrong intent], for R. Simeon said: It is impossible [to have a valid sacrifice] without slaughtering, without receiving, and without sprinkling, but it is possible without carrying. [How so?] One slaughters it at the side of the altar and sprinkles. R. Eliezer says: If one goes where he needs to go, an [illegitimate] intention disqualifies [it]; where he doesn’t need to go, an [illegitimate] intention does not disqualify [it]. [ . . . ]

2:2. One who slaughters a sacrifice [intending] to sprinkle its blood outside [the Temple] or part of its blood outside; to burn its innards or part of its innards outside; to eat its flesh or as much as an olive[’s bulk] of its flesh outside, or to eat as much as an olive[’s bulk] of the skin of the fat-tail outside, it is invalid, but it does not involve karet [the punishment of excision].

[One who slaughters a sacrifice intending] to sprinkle its blood or part of its blood the next day; to burn its innards or part of its innards on the next day; to eat its flesh or as much as an olive[’s bulk] of its flesh on the next day; or to eat as much as an olive[’s bulk] of the skin of its fat-tail on the next day, it is pigul [a foul, disqualified sacrifice], and involves karet. [ . . . ]

3:6 An [illegitimate] intention does not disqualify [a sacrifice] except when it refers to after its time or outside its prescribed place, and [in the case of] a pesaḥ̣ [paschal sacrifice] and a ḥ̣atat [purification offering], [the intention to slaughter them] for the sake of their being a different sacrifice.

Adapted from the translation ofJoshua Kulp.

Published in: The Posen Library of Jewish Culture and Civilization, vol. 2: Emerging Judaism.

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A significant feature of the rabbis’ legal approach is the idea that the presence or absence of proper intention determines the character of an act as legally valid or invalid. This legal “nominalism” is apparent in m. Zevaḥim 1:4; 2:2; and 3:6, where improper intentions have the power to affect the status of sacrifices partially, fully, or not at all.

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