Bavli Bava Meẓi‘a

b. Bava Meẓi‘a 52a–b

Until when is he [the defrauded party who has been given a worn coin] permitted to retract [the transaction and return the coin]? In towns, until he can show [the coin] to a money changer; in villages, until [the following] Sabbath Eve. If he [the original holder of the coin] recognizes it [the coin, as originally his], he must accept it back from him [the defrauded party] even after twelve months, and he [the original holder of the coin] can claim nothing but a grievance against him. [ . . . ]

If he [the original holder of the coin] recognizes it [the coin, as originally his], he must accept it back from him even after twelve months. . . . When is this the case? If [you say this is so] in towns, have you not said, until he can show [the coin] to a money changer [and not a full two months]? And if [you say this is so] in villages, have you not said, until [the following] Sabbath Eve?

Said R. Ḥisda: Pious behavior is being taught here.

b. Bava Meẓ‘ia 30b

R. Ishmael ben R. Yosi was walking on the road. He met a man carrying a bundle of branches. He put them down, rested, and then said to him [R. Ishmael], “[Help me to] pick them up [again].” “What is their value?” he asked. “Half a zuz [one eighth of a shekel],” he said. So he [R. Ishmael] gave him half a zuz and declared them hefker [ownerless property that anyone could come and take]. Thereupon he [the bearer of the branches] reacquired them. He [R. Ishmael] gave him another half zuz and again declared them hefker. He saw that the man was about to reacquire them [the branches] again, so he said to him, “I have declared it hefker for all the world but not to you.”

But in a case such as this, is it then hefker? Have we not learned that Beth Shammai says: Hefker for the poor [only] is valid hefker; but Beth Hillel says: It is not valid hefker as long as it is hefker for the poor and the rich, like in the shemitah [the sabbatical year for agriculture].

Rather, R. Ishmael son of R. Yosi did in fact declare it hefker for all; he just prevented the other [man from taking possession of the branches yet again] with mere words.

But was not R. Ishmael son of R. Yosi an elder, for whom [there is an exemption from helping one take up a load because] it was undignified? [And if so, was not his stratagem and financial loss unnecessary?] R. Ishmael son of R. Yosi acted within the line of the law [and waived his right to an exemption].

For R. Joseph learned: And you shall show them [the way that they must walk and the work that they shall do] (Exodus 18:20)—this refers to the house of life; the way—this refers to the practice of loving deeds; that they must walk—this refers to visiting the sick; therein—this refers to burial; and the work—this refers to strict law; that they shall do—to [acts] within the line of the law [i.e., pious behavior]. [ . . . ]

[As for the claim that] That they shall do refers to [acts] within the line of the law: R. Yoḥanan said: Jerusalem was destroyed only because they gave judgments [merely] in accordance with Torah law. Were they then to have judged according to arbitrary judgments? Rather say: [Jerusalem was destroyed] because they based their judgments on the strict line of the law [shurat ha-din] and did not act within the line of the law [i.e., piously].

b. Bava Meẓi‘a 83a

Certain porters broke his barrel of wine [belonging to Rabba bar bar Ḥanan—Ed.]. He took their cloaks [as payment]. They came and told Rav.

He [Rav] said to him [Rabba bar bar Ḥanan]: Give them their cloaks.

He [Rabba bar bar Ḥanan] said to him: [Is] this the halakhah?

He [Rav] said to him: Yes [word missing in some manuscripts—Ed.], [as it is written]: That you may walk in the way of good men (Proverbs 2:20).

[Rabba bar bar Ḥanan] gave them their cloaks. They [the porters] said to [Rav]: We are poor people and we toiled all day and we are hungry and we have nothing.

[Rav] said to [Rabba bar bar Ḥanan]: Go [and] give [them] their wages.

[Rabba bar bar Ḥanan] said to him: [Is] this the halakhah?

[Rav] said to him: Yes [word missing in some manuscripts—Ed.], [as it is written]: And keep the paths of the righteous (Proverbs 2:20).

Published in: The Posen Library of Jewish Culture and Civilization, vol. 2: Emerging Judaism.

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The rabbinic conception of Torah, like the biblical conception, was a maximalist one, embracing far more than is signaled by the contemporary term law. The student of Torah debated not only what was legally required but also what was morally desired. Several rabbinic sources consider moral standards that exceed the legal norm and signal a degree of piety. This text from b. Bava Meẓi‘a 52b provides an example of pious behavior (midat ḥasidut) that goes beyond the strict letter of the law in the case of coins that have been worn away through constant use. The Mishnah encourages people to allow the return of worn coins even beyond the legally mandated time frame, and the Gemara refers to this as pious behavior.

Another phrase that expresses pious behavior draws on the metaphor of law as a line (shurah) that defines a bounded area of acceptable legal action. All that is within the area up to and including the line is legal. This metaphor of law as a boundary line enclosing a legal domain informs two further metaphors. Sin is conceived as ‘averah—“crossing over” the line so as to step out of the bounded area of permitted behavior. By contrast, the pious act of renouncing the full rights and entitlements due under law is represented by the metaphor of staying well within the bounded area defined by the line of the law (lifnim mi-shurat ha-din). In b. Bava Meẓi‘a 30b, R. Ishmael ben R. Yosi exemplifies this kind of piety. As a person of dignity, he is exempt from the biblical requirement to assist a man taking up a heavy load. Rather than exercise this exemption, R. Ishmael simply relieves the man of his load by purchasing it from him. The man has lost nothing, and R. Ishmael has avoided undignified labor, though at a financial cost. The strategy almost backfires, causing the anonymous voice of the Talmud to ask why R. Ishmael ben R. Yosi did not simply exercise his exemption in the first place rather than incur this financial loss. The explanation that he waived his right to an exemption in order to act piously is followed by a passage that grounds the principle of acting lifnim mi-shurat ha-din—renouncing a legal right out of consideration for a less privileged individual—in scripture.

The further claim is made that insisting on the strict letter of the law can be destructive. The pious individual should at times forgo his rights according to the theoretically correct law (stop short of the strict law) in order to achieve a higher virtue. Going one step further, b. Bava Meẓi‘a 83a seems to assert not only that it is pious to be generous—yielding to others something to which they are not legally entitled—but also that it is required. In this unusual text, going beyond what the law requires may itself be a legal obligation.

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