Responsum: On Sharing the Cost of Ransoming Captives

Regarding our brothers, people of Rheims, who were set upon and smitten by an adversary and an enemy (Esther 7:6) on their way to the market in Troyes, the kind people of Troyes risked their lives and took upon themselves to pay the ransom of thirty pounds [litra]. The captives gave most of it [i.e., the ransom] and the community of Troyes took the rest of the ransom upon themselves and their brethren in the surrounding areas: Sens, Auxerre, and the two people in Chalon-sur-Saône. They ordered that each give a dinar per pound, and if someone should refuse, he and all his children would be forbidden to join the community, and his bread and wine would be forbidden. They established a fine of thirty dinars [for refusing to pay]. In addition, they decreed that nobody could absolve themselves of this.

When the writ came to the community of Sens, they stood up and absolved themselves of the decree, and excused themselves, saying that the great troubles around them had caused them to become very poor. They also said that they do not have to accept the decree of those who do not live in their city and are not part of their troubles. Indeed, the messenger from Troyes found them crushed under a great trouble that had occurred when an abomination [cross] was smashed nearby. Even so, they [i.e., the Jews of Sens] joined them and sent a donation. You asked if the community of Troyes acted rightly in enacting their decree and whether the community of Sens must take heed or not.

Thus have we been shown from heaven: A decree cannot be enacted in this way, as “an individual excommunicated by one town is not excommunicated in his own town” [b. Mo‘ed Katan 16a]. And since a city does not have the power to excommunicate a person from another city, all the more so a community. And they—since it is clear that they are suffering, and the “discerning ones” in Troyes saw the poverty and troubles they encountered, but still decreed to extract more of their blood and squeeze their testicles, so they would give up their cloak [see b. Shevu‘ot 41a]—how could they listen? How could they accept it? Is it not the case that we make no decree upon the community unless the majority are able to abide by it? As it says: The Almighty, whom we cannot find out, is excellent in power (Job 37:22). And if they thought like him who says, “It is better that both should drink and die than that one witness his companion’s death” [b. Bava Meẓi‘a 62a], we do not follow that view, but follow the later mishnah that teaches “Until R. Akiva came and taught that your brother may live with you (Leviticus 25:36) your life takes precedence over his life” [b. Bava Meẓi‘a 62a]. As for them, their lives hung in the balance at that time.

And if they rely on what R. Eliezer said: He who causes others to do good is greater than one who does good: And the work of the righteous shall be peace (Isaiah 32:17), and Rava said to the residents of Maḥoza, “I beg of you, act for each other so that you may be on good terms with the government” [b. Bava Batra 9a], this was not via decree but with convincing words, for the words of favored ones persuade them. We do not find that one city can take money from the inhabitants of another city, not due to possessing greater wisdom, money, or number, even for the sake of a commandment. For even though this commandment [i.e., redeeming captives] is a great one, as is written: For He will bless you [ . . . ] for this thing the Lord your God will bless you (Deuteronomy 15:10), it is taught: The [human] court cannot enforce any commandment whose reward is written immediately after it [through punishing transgressors; see b. Ḥullin 110b]. This matter [instead] depends on generosity of the heart and convincing words, as it says: From every man whose heart so moves him (Exodus 25:2). Even inhabitants of one town who gather in another town for an assembly or a fast, and they [i.e., members of the host town] force them to give charity, they do not have the power to take it; rather, they [i.e., the guests] take it and bring it with them to the poor of their own town, as it is taught in a baraita: Residents of one town who went to another town [and made them pledge to give charity, they must give. But when they go, they bring it with them; b. Megillah 27a].

The general rule is that [residents of one town] cannot force [the residents of] another at all, even if they are greater and more numerous, except in the case of the suppression of sin, as when [one group] comes with the claim that they are being caught [by non-Jews] due to [the other group], as it says: They shall stumble upon one another (Leviticus 26:37): One because of the iniquity of the other; this teaches us that all Israel is responsible for each other [b. Shevu‘ot 39a]. So it is taught in a baraita:

R. Eleazar ben Jacob stated: “I heard that the court may administer lashes and penalties without biblical authority, not in order to transgress words of the Torah but to make a fence for the Torah.” [b. Yevamot 90b]

In a case like this, “whatever the court declares ownerless is ownerless” [b. Yevamot 89b, b. Gittin 36b, b. Shekalim 3a], but to commandeer money from people, even a prince [nasi] in Israel is not listened to. For indeed Rabbi [Judah ha-Nasi], who was a prince, did not have the power to commandeer at all. [ . . . ] Therefore, the decree of Troyes does not come into effect and does not need release.

Regarding what you asked, if they made a decree on the community of Troyes that they should be released, must they pay heed? Certainly! For the decree of Sens is valid, while that of Troyes is not, as is proven by the words that were deduced:

He came and asked the house of study, they said to him, “His excommunication is valid but yours is not.” And what is the remedy? “Go to him that he may absolve you.” [b. Mo‘ed Katan 17a]¹

Here, too, Sens must release its ban but not Troyes, since [the latter’s] is an empty curse. But those who sent a donation are worthy of blessing.

Regarding what you asked about the community of Troyes that decreed that the ban may not be absolved—if they come to absolve, can it be fixed? Is the latter decree superior to the former one? This is the solution, since the rabbis said: Any prohibition decided by vote requires another vote to rescind it [b. Beẓah 5b]; they should arise and appoint a second group like the group of the first decree, and they should absolve the last decree first, and afterward the first decree. But if they did the first one first and afterward the last, they have done nothing.

Peace.

Joseph Tov ‘Elem ben R. Samuel.