Commentary: On the Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Beẓah

“And he said that they are permitted.” Permitted for what purpose? Rav said: They may be accepted, and Levi said: They may be eaten. [ . . . ] An objection was raised: “If a non-Jew brought a gift to a Jew [on a festival], even mefulamim fish or produce from that day, they are permitted.” This is perfectly understandable according to the opinion that they may be accepted. However, according to the opinion that they may be eaten, may produce from that same day be eaten? According to this reasoning, may produce from that day be moved? Rather, we are dealing with adimi fish and produce that is preserved in greens [i.e., it was not picked on that day]. And why is it called “from that day”? Because it is [fresh], as though it were from that day. R. Papa said that the law is as follows: If a non-Jew brought a gift to a Jew on a festival, and if some of that [plant] species is still attached [to the ground or to a tree], it is forbidden. And in the evening as well [after the festival], it remains prohibited for the time it would take to prepare it. In a case where none of that species is still attached, then if it is within the boundary [of the distance one can travel on a festival], it is permitted, but if it came from outside the boundary, it is forbidden. And something that was brought [from outside the boundary] for one Jew is permitted to another Jew. [b. Beẓah 24b–25a]

Rashi

Be accepted: be moved, as he was not so stringent as to forbid something be moved when it was possibly prepared before the festival. R. Gamaliel did not, however, permit it to be eaten.

And Levi said: They may be eaten: in R. Gamaliel’s opinion. This does not mean that Rav and Levi agree with him; they are simply explaining his viewpoint.

Mefulamim: moist; moiste in Old French.

They are permitted: and this must necessarily be the opinion of R. Gamaliel, as he is the one who rules leniently.

Perfectly understandable: [the argument is reasonable] even though its status is not uncertain. It is definitely muktseh, as it can be explained that he permits the item to be moved. The Gemara below will raise a difficulty against this: “Is produce plucked on that day permitted to be moved? Granted that R. Gamaliel is lenient with regard to something that was possibly prepared, but is he lenient concerning an item that was definitely not prepared?”

Rather, with adimi fish: red fish, that is, which have not lost their freshness and their redness under their gills, where they are examined.

And produce that is preserved [kevishe] in greens: after it was picked, it was immediately buried with greens so that so it should not lose its freshness. Kevishe means “buried,” as in the phrase: “if a head was placed on hot ashes [kivsha]” [b. Ḥullin 93b]. Such produce is certainly considered prepared, as it is clear that it was ready on the eve of the festival. This ruling comes to teach us that even though it is similar to produce from that day, we are not concerned about appearances. My teachers explained that adimi fish means that it was chopped up, similar to adamuye damu’ah [they sliced it] [b. Avodah Zarah 38b]. However, I find this explanation difficult, as what is the significance of this state of the fish in our context?

If some of that species is still attached, it is forbidden: as muktseh. Even R. Simeon agrees that muktseh applies to dried figs and raisins, and attached produce is comparable to dried figs and raisins—since he did not pluck them the day before, he has removed them from his mind. And with regard to attached produce, there is no difference between one’s own property and that of a non-Jew.

And in the evening it remains prohibited for the time it would take to prepare it: so that one should not derive benefit from a forbidden labor performed on a festival. Now, when it states: “And in the evening it remains prohibited for the time it would take to prepare it,” this indicates that after such time, it is permitted, even on that first evening. This is the case despite the fact that it refers to the night of the second festival day. Whichever way you look at this issue, he merely has to wait the time it takes to prepare it, and it is permitted. If the night is a regular weekday, then he has waited sufficient time, and if it is holy, this means that the produce was picked on a weekday. This is my opinion, and I have many proofs for it, e.g., the case in tractate b. Eruvin [39b] of a young deer [which was trapped by a non-Jew on the first day of a festival and slaughtered on the second day], and the ruling that an egg which was laid on one festival day is permitted on the next day [b. Beẓah 4b]. It can be inferred from these cases that since one of the days must be a weekday, whichever way you look at it, the produce is permitted.

I did not have the honor of asking R. Jacob about this matter, as it was treated as permitted in our places and it was obvious to me. After the rabbi died, I heard that R. Isaac ha-Levi forbids it until the night of the conclusion of the second festival day, and that all the inhabitants of his city follow his ruling and that the Great Laws [Halakhot gedolot] also prohibit it. I debated the case with him, but I was unable to convince him. His whole reasoning is based on the fact that it states: “for the time it would take to prepare it,” which implies that it is referring to a night suitable for its preparation. I, however, maintain that it is necessary to wait for the time it takes to prepare it only in case the day was holy, and this night is a weekday. One proof for this is that since it does not say the produce is forbidden until the night of the second day, this shows that the phrase “for the time it would take to prepare it” refers to the first night. I have found a responsum of R. Gershom, the light of the exile, which accords with my opinion, and recently a letter came to me from Worms stating that a great man had arrived there, an elderly scholar from Rome called R. Qalonymos. He is an expert in the whole Talmud, and he ruled likewise and disagreed with them.

If it came from outside the boundary, it is prohibited: I have not heard a convincing explanation of this ruling. For if it is due to it being muktseh, then why is it permitted to another Jew? If the reason is that a prohibition was performed with the produce for that Jew, then it should likewise be forbidden to another Jew, as we learned, “if a non-Jew kindled a lamp [a Jew may use its light,] but if he did so for a Jew, it is prohibited” [m. Shabbat 16:8], and the mishnah does not differentiate between that Jew and another. Perhaps the sages were not so stringent with regard to the prohibition of boundaries, as it applies [only] by rabbinic law, and they felt it was sufficient to prohibit the produce [alone] to that individual.