Mishnah Terumot

Terumot discusses the produce due to priests (one-fiftieth of one’s crop) and to Levites (a tithe of the tithe). The first excerpt presented here (m. Terumot 8:1–2) is a classic rabbinic example of a “border case” in which legal principles are illuminated by constructing a hypothetical situation in which distinct categories collide. It presents a case in which a person who is permitted to perform a certain act—such as consuming food designated for members of the priestly caste—undergoes a change in status that renders the act prohibited; the person loses his or her access to priestly perquisites at the very moment that he or she is engaging in the act. Does the person halt the activity or complete it? Is the person guilty of a violation? If the act was a ritual act, is it valid? In other words, is the act judged by its initial permitted status or its final prohibited status?

Another kind of hypothetical case appears in m. Terumot 8:11–12. How should one behave when confronted with the choice between actively defiling a single loaf of sanctified bread oneself and passively enabling the defilement of many loaves of bread at the hands of another? The principle that one should passively allow the defilement of many loaves rather than actively defiling a single loaf may appear noble in the first mishnah, but the application of this principle to the case of rape in the very next mishnah raises profound moral questions.

Engage with this Source

Terumot discusses the produce due to priests (one-fiftieth of one’s crop) and to Levites (a tithe of the tithe). The first excerpt presented here (m. Terumot 8:1–2) is a classic rabbinic example of a “border case” in which legal principles are illuminated by constructing a hypothetical situation in which distinct categories collide. It presents a case in which a person who is permitted to perform a certain act—such as consuming food designated for members of the priestly caste—undergoes a change in status that renders the act prohibited; the person loses his or her access to priestly perquisites at the very moment that he or she is engaging in the act. Does the person halt the activity or complete it? Is the person guilty of a violation? If the act was a ritual act, is it valid? In other words, is the act judged by its initial permitted status or its final prohibited status?

Another kind of hypothetical case appears in m. Terumot 8:11–12. How should one behave when confronted with the choice between actively defiling a single loaf of sanctified bread oneself and passively enabling the defilement of many loaves of bread at the hands of another? The principle that one should passively allow the defilement of many loaves rather than actively defiling a single loaf may appear noble in the first mishnah, but the application of this principle to the case of rape in the very next mishnah raises profound moral questions.

Read more

You may also like