Commentary on the Book of Creation (Genesis)

[ . . . what is] the reason for God creating the heavens and the earth, [as they are,] containing diversity? And why did He not make the created world one and simple, containing neither diversity or opposites, nor difference of quantity or division, so that it would all be one simple, perfect substance, containing neither diversity nor deficiency or want?

We say that, in our experience, every agent is necessarily one of two kinds: either it acts as it does by necessity; the act of such an agent is generated solely by its nature. This [kind of] agent can generate only one [kind of] act, and no other act can conceivably be generated by it. It is inconceivable and unimaginable that it should perform another act and an opposite act or [any] different one. For instance, the act of snow is to chill. [The snow] is never free of this act, and it is inconceivable and unimaginable that it should perform [any] other act, whether its opposite or [any] different act. This kind of agent will only [be found in] inanimate [beings].

Or the agent can generate an act of which it may be periodically free. This is of two kinds: the first kind [can perform only] a single act; it can do none other, and, doing this act, it knows none other. [This is] like the bee, which has no knowledge except [the knowledge of] the production of honey, although periodically it may be free of this act. Or like the silkworm which does nothing except the production of the silk-thread, in which it wraps itself until it dies. It may be free of this act, when it pierces the silk cocoon, becomes a butterfly, and flies about before it dies by weaving the thread to close upon itself. Or like the spider which, when it acts, does nothing except weaving [its web], although it may be free of this act and stop doing it periodically. This kind of act is only produced by a non-rational animal. But fire and snow, as mentioned above, are never free from their act; fire [cannot be free] of burning and snow from chilling, not even for a brief second, for as long as they exist.

The other kind of agent is capable of doing various things . . . and it may periodically be free . . . of them . . . acts which may resemble one another. This is as the human being, who may do good and evil, sins and righteous deeds. He may produce wondrous articrafts, such as clothing, and buildings, like the construction of towns, cities and houses, digging canals and raising bridges. And he can make artifacts, like utensils and weapons and similar things. In addition to this, thanks to his ruse and cunning and by applying his intelligence, he can procure birds from the sky, fish from the water and minerals from the bottom of the sea. He builds ships and vessels, for transportation over the water in such a way that he is protected from the waves, and can obtain commodities from the most distant islands and lands. The agent who acts thus is only [the one who is] rational, intelligent, able to choose.

To sum up what we have described: agents are of two kinds: [the first is] inanimate, like fire and snow, which can only do a single act. It is never free of its act, and its existence without its act is inconceivable. [The second kind is] animate. It may periodically be free of its act, and [even] when it is not acting, its existence is conceivable. This last agent is of two kinds: when the first kind, [which is] like the bee, the silkworm, and the spider, acts, it can only do a single act, and no other act is conceivable for him. When the second kind, [which] is like the human being, acts, it is capable of doing all [sorts of] acts and crafts. [ . . . ]

Now the inanimate agent cannot be said [to be] wise, like the fire, which is not called “wise” in its burning, nor is snow [called] “knowledgeable” for its chilling. Similarly, the irrational animate agent is not called “wise.” For example, the [silk]worm is not called “knowledgeable” for making the silk-thread, nor the bee [called] “wise” for making honey. For this [kind of act] involves neither consideration nor reflection. Nor does it imply that its agent has the power to do this act rather than another. A human being [on the other hand], has the power to do both a thing and its opposite. He has the properties described above, namely his deeds and the wonders of his ruse and craftsmanship [which are the outcome of] his deliberation. Therefore he is called “wise,” “knowledgeable,” and “a philosopher.”

Now it has been established, by logical proofs and by way of reasonable demonstrations, that the world is a made product, subjected to a Lord and a God, and that it was brought about by a maker, a Lord and a God whose works are multiple. We say that [since] His act of making is unlike the act of the inanimate agent; and [since] the irrational animate also does not [deserve to be properly called] a maker; hence, we must say that He is a wise, knowledgeable maker, who has the power to do both a thing and its opposite, who exercises choice in whatever He will do or has done, and who acts [only] whenever He wants to, and not as a result of an inanimate nature, nor out of an inbuilt natural disposition which brings the act about. If so, we say that God, the exalted, created the created beings so that they vary, to indicate to us that He is wise, that He has power over His acts, that He exercises choice and preference in what He does: He is not acting out of necessity or natural disposition, He is neither coerced nor forced, nor does He act by nature, because of an inbuilt disposition or in response to a need. For the Creator of the world did not create heat without creating cold, which is its opposite, along with it. He did not create the heavy without creating along with it the lightweight, which is its opposite. He did not make the fine-textured without creating along with it the coarse-textured. He did not create spirits without creating along with them bodies, which are distinct and different from them. He created water as cold and humid, and fire as its opposite, hot and dry. He created fire and air as lightweight, and [He created] water and earth as heavy. He created the noble, subtle souls, and [He created] coarse bodies as their opposite. All this [He did], as we have said, in order to indicate to us that He is wise, having the power to do whatever He wishes, as He wishes and whenever He wishes, and that in His might, power and wisdom, He is different from any maker or agent we know among us or within our world. This is our doctrine concerning the wherefore for the creation of the world containing diversity.

Source: CUL T-S Ar. 52.184.