Bavli Bava Metsi‘a

The rabbinic conception of Torah, like the biblical conception, was a maximalist one, embracing far more than is signaled by the contemporary term law. The student of Torah debated not only what was legally required but also what was morally desired. Several rabbinic sources consider moral standards that exceed the legal norm and signal a degree of piety. This text from b. Bava Metsi‘a 52b provides an example of pious behavior (midat ḥasidut) that goes beyond the strict letter of the law in the case of coins that have been worn away through constant use. The Mishnah encourages people to allow the return of worn coins even beyond the legally mandated time frame, and the Gemara refers to this as pious behavior.

Another phrase that expresses pious behavior draws on the metaphor of law as a line (shurah) that defines a bounded area of acceptable legal action. All that is within the area up to and including the line is legal. This metaphor of law as a boundary line enclosing a legal domain informs two further metaphors. Sin is conceived as ‘averah—“crossing over” the line so as to step out of the bounded area of permitted behavior. By contrast, the pious act of renouncing the full rights and entitlements due under law is represented by the metaphor of staying well within the bounded area defined by the line of the law (lifnim mi-shurat ha-din). In b. Bava Metsi‘a 30b, R. Ishmael ben R. Yosi exemplifies this kind of piety. As a person of dignity, he is exempt from the biblical requirement to assist a man taking up a heavy load. Rather than exercise this exemption, R. Ishmael simply relieves the man of his load by purchasing it from him. The man has lost nothing, and R. Ishmael has avoided undignified labor, though at a financial cost. The strategy almost backfires, causing the anonymous voice of the Talmud to ask why R. Ishmael ben R. Yosi did not simply exercise his exemption in the first place rather than incur this financial loss. The explanation that he waived his right to an exemption in order to act piously is followed by a passage that grounds the principle of acting lifnim mi-shurat ha-din—renouncing a legal right out of consideration for a less privileged individual—in scripture.

The further claim is made that insisting on the strict letter of the law can be destructive. The pious individual should at times forgo his rights according to the theoretically correct law (stop short of the strict law) in order to achieve a higher virtue. Going one step further, b. Bava Metsi‘a 83a seems to assert not only that it is pious to be generous—yielding to others something to which they are not legally entitled—but also that it is required. In this unusual text, going beyond what the law requires may itself be a legal obligation.

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The rabbinic conception of Torah, like the biblical conception, was a maximalist one, embracing far more than is signaled by the contemporary term law. The student of Torah debated not only what was legally required but also what was morally desired. Several rabbinic sources consider moral standards that exceed the legal norm and signal a degree of piety. This text from b. Bava Metsi‘a 52b provides an example of pious behavior (midat ḥasidut) that goes beyond the strict letter of the law in the case of coins that have been worn away through constant use. The Mishnah encourages people to allow the return of worn coins even beyond the legally mandated time frame, and the Gemara refers to this as pious behavior.

Another phrase that expresses pious behavior draws on the metaphor of law as a line (shurah) that defines a bounded area of acceptable legal action. All that is within the area up to and including the line is legal. This metaphor of law as a boundary line enclosing a legal domain informs two further metaphors. Sin is conceived as ‘averah—“crossing over” the line so as to step out of the bounded area of permitted behavior. By contrast, the pious act of renouncing the full rights and entitlements due under law is represented by the metaphor of staying well within the bounded area defined by the line of the law (lifnim mi-shurat ha-din). In b. Bava Metsi‘a 30b, R. Ishmael ben R. Yosi exemplifies this kind of piety. As a person of dignity, he is exempt from the biblical requirement to assist a man taking up a heavy load. Rather than exercise this exemption, R. Ishmael simply relieves the man of his load by purchasing it from him. The man has lost nothing, and R. Ishmael has avoided undignified labor, though at a financial cost. The strategy almost backfires, causing the anonymous voice of the Talmud to ask why R. Ishmael ben R. Yosi did not simply exercise his exemption in the first place rather than incur this financial loss. The explanation that he waived his right to an exemption in order to act piously is followed by a passage that grounds the principle of acting lifnim mi-shurat ha-din—renouncing a legal right out of consideration for a less privileged individual—in scripture.

The further claim is made that insisting on the strict letter of the law can be destructive. The pious individual should at times forgo his rights according to the theoretically correct law (stop short of the strict law) in order to achieve a higher virtue. Going one step further, b. Bava Metsi‘a 83a seems to assert not only that it is pious to be generous—yielding to others something to which they are not legally entitled—but also that it is required. In this unusual text, going beyond what the law requires may itself be a legal obligation.

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