Commentary: On Genesis

[A]nd offer him [Isaac] there as a burnt-offering (Genesis 22:2)

Its plain meaning is that he [Abraham] should carry out [with Isaac] all the actions that, were he to perform them with an animal, would be called a “burnt-offering,” including both slaying [the animal] and burning [it on the altar]. For the term ‘olah does not connote [here] its purely linguistic definition—that is, merely “that which ascends,” a feminine noun—but that which is ascribed to it in Jewish law, which includes slaying and burning. For these actions, which constitute a burnt-offering, are no different in the case of Abraham and in the case of Moses, may peace be upon them.

However, a difference exists in the order of the actions. For, in the case of Abraham, [we have] the slaying of the burnt-offering on the altar. In the case of Moses, [we have] the placement of the fire on the altar, then the wood, then the arrangement of the limbs of the sacrificial victim, not directly on the altar, but on the wood.

Thus, the term burnt-offering means the same thing in both cases, but the order of the actions performed in it is different. And if slaying and burning occur in both cases, so, too, must the other acts of a burnt-offering.

But we see that the Exalted One prevented him from slaying, after those other acts he performed with Isaac, the last of which was: And Abraham picked up the knife to slay his son (Genesis 22:10).

Now, we must interpret this in a manner that complies with reason. For some explain, regarding this, that when He, the mighty and majestic, commanded him [Abraham] to offer him [Isaac] as a burnt-offering, it was an exception [to the usual interpretation of the word]. For they consider it impossible [that God would command such a thing], based on what comes before in [scripture]: [H]ow shall I know that I am to possess it? (Genesis 15:8). [In this passage, Abraham asks for a divine promise that he will have an heir and will inherit the land through his offspring, a promise that he receives from God.] But His word indicates His intent. There can be no exception or condition to His precepts or proscriptions. Rather, He precisely articulates them through His word so that His intent will be understood. And did not His word go forth as proof of His intent? Thus, the way to the knowledge of His intent was paved through His word. [In other words, ‘olah must be interpreted according to the usual meaning of the word.]

And because this is so, behold, the [proper] interpretation of this text is that, when the Exalted One said to him [Abraham], “[and] offer him there as a burnt-offering,” His intent was made absolutely clear by this, as though He said: “My purpose in saying to you ‘burnt-offering’ is that you should take him, bind him, place him on the altar above the wood, take the knife, and wait for what I shall command you to do afterward.” Now, he understood His intent by His statement: and offer him up there as a burnt-offering in accordance with the explanation mentioned above. And thus [Abraham] was tested, in that he presumed he would be ordered to slay [Isaac], as implied by His word: “Take the knife after binding him and placing him atop the altar, then wait for me to instruct you what to do with him.” This is a sign of His intention afterward to tell him to slay him, thereby intensifying the trial upon him, just as when one is told: “Prepare your inkwell and pens, and take paper in hand,” he assumes that afterward he will be directed to write. Now, if I extend this [line of thought] to Abraham, then behold: Abraham understood His intent when He said, “and offer him there as a burnt-offering.” There was no need for further explanation. Rather, the explanation was implicit at [the moment of] the [initial] command. By this comes about the ordained trial the Exalted One intended by His command.

There is another [good] way to view this. This was a command that was to be postponed; it was not for immediate action. After Abraham received the command, some time passed [before he acted]. If Abraham had acted directly after the command, he would have completed it before the third day. Abraham would have taken the initiative and spent the night traveling to the land of Mount Moriah, [setting out] as soon as God said to him, “that I will point out to you” (Genesis 22:2). He would not have delayed his journey until morning. He would have hurried to trek [there] day and night, arrived on the second day, and carried out what he was ordered to do. But since the command was not an immediate one but was postponed, he was permitted, by [virtue of] his resolve [to carry it out], to postpone it until morning, since he had resolved to do it. So he proceeded at a normal pace, without undue effort. When he arrived on the third day, he then hurried to sacrifice Isaac as a burnt-offering. When he finally seized the knife, He forbade the slaying, due to his [Abraham’s] previous resolution to do so, which stood in the stead [of the action itself], causing Him to rescind [His command], being a rightful substitution for it. Similarly, [this is the case] when one resolves to perform a circumcision, at the start of the eighth day [i.e., at nightfall], and this is a rightful substitution [for its postponement until the morning]. It would not be permitted to postpone it to another time of day [at all], but for the [prior] determination to do it.