Bavli Gittin

The rabbis adjusted biblical laws not only through extreme forms of exegesis but also through independent enactments, such as Hillel’s prosbul (see “Mishnah Gittin”). Although this independent legislative activity was well tolerated in Palestine in the tannaitic and early amoraic periods, later Babylonian authorities provided revisionist accounts of enactments that appeared to uproot biblical law, emphasizing either that there was scriptural warrant for the change or that the rabbinic enactment was actually a conservative reimposition of an earlier status quo rather than a true innovation. Both of these revisionist strategies are apparent in b. Gittin 36, which discusses Hillel’s prosbul, a legal mechanism by which Hillel addressed private lenders’ reservations about lending money as a shemitah year approached, at the end of which outstanding debts were abrogated (canceled). Hillel’s solution was to have the loans transferred to the public courts, because only private loans are abrogated during shemitah. Contrary to earlier Palestinian sources that see Hillel’s prosbul as uprooting a law of the Torah—the release of debts in the seventh year—the sugya in the Babylonian Talmud argues that Hillel’s prosbul did not uproot Torah law. Rather, it reversed an earlier rabbinic ruling that had extended the obligation of debt release in a supererogatory fashion and so restored Torah law to its proper course after a rabbinically imposed stringency. In this revisionist account, no rabbi ever permitted what was biblically prohibited.

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The rabbis adjusted biblical laws not only through extreme forms of exegesis but also through independent enactments, such as Hillel’s prosbul (see “Mishnah Gittin”). Although this independent legislative activity was well tolerated in Palestine in the tannaitic and early amoraic periods, later Babylonian authorities provided revisionist accounts of enactments that appeared to uproot biblical law, emphasizing either that there was scriptural warrant for the change or that the rabbinic enactment was actually a conservative reimposition of an earlier status quo rather than a true innovation. Both of these revisionist strategies are apparent in b. Gittin 36, which discusses Hillel’s prosbul, a legal mechanism by which Hillel addressed private lenders’ reservations about lending money as a shemitah year approached, at the end of which outstanding debts were abrogated (canceled). Hillel’s solution was to have the loans transferred to the public courts, because only private loans are abrogated during shemitah. Contrary to earlier Palestinian sources that see Hillel’s prosbul as uprooting a law of the Torah—the release of debts in the seventh year—the sugya in the Babylonian Talmud argues that Hillel’s prosbul did not uproot Torah law. Rather, it reversed an earlier rabbinic ruling that had extended the obligation of debt release in a supererogatory fashion and so restored Torah law to its proper course after a rabbinically imposed stringency. In this revisionist account, no rabbi ever permitted what was biblically prohibited.

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